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I’m going to use the year 1993 as the focal point of my talk. Obviously, the Ohio
Supreme Court had used its own constitution as the basis of decisions many times
before that, but that’s when the court expressly joined the New Judicial Federalism
Movement. The official announcement, so to speak, came in the syllabus of Arnold
v. Cleveland,2 authored by Justice Andy Douglas. He wrote:
A noticeable trend has recently emerged among state courts. It appears
that more state courts are increasingly relying on their constitutions when
examining personal rights and liberties. . . . In joining the growing trend
in other states, we believe that the Ohio Constitution is a document of
independent force. In the areas of individual rights and civil liberties, the
United States Constitution, where applicable to the states, provides a floor
below which state court decisions may not fall. As long as state courts
provide at least as much protection as the United States Supreme Court
has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, state courts
are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to
individuals and groups.3
Just as an aside, it is quite interesting that the Arnold case is the one in which
Ohio joined the New Judicial Federalism Movement, because the case itself dealt
with the right to bear arms.4 A challenge was brought under the Ohio Constitution to
a Cleveland ordinance that banned the possession and sale of assault weapons in the
city.5 The court noted that unlike the Second Amendment,6 the right to bear arms in
1

Visiting Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. All Rights Reserved.

2

67 Ohio St. 3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993).

3

Id. at 42, 616 N.E.2d at 168-69 (emphasis added).

4

Id. at 39, 616 N.E.2d at 166.

5

Id. at 39, 616 N.E.2d at 166.

6

“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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Ohio is a personal, not a collective right,7 but subject to reasonable regulation.8 The
court held that the ban on that limited category of weapon was a reasonable exercise
of the police power.9
As I’m sure everyone knows, this issue was just argued to the Ohio Supreme
Court in the concealed carry case, where the concealed carry law was challenged
solely on state constitutional grounds.10 But back to the big picture.
I’m going to talk about the approaches the court has taken since it announced it
was joining the New Judicial Federalism Movement in 1993. Although different
nomenclature is used, there is generally thought to be three approaches to state
constitutional analysis. I like the language Professor Jennifer Friesen uses in her
book on state constitutional law.11
First is the lockstep approach. Here, the state court does not deviate in any way
from U.S. Supreme Court analysis and precedent when interpreting state
constitutional provisions that are analogous to federal provisions.
Second is the reactive posture, or what Professor Friesen calls the
“supplemental/independent method.”12 I like to call this the selective independent
posture. Here’s what Professor Friesen has to say about this approach:
The supplemental approach treats state constitutional rights as
supplemental to a federal benchmark, necessary only when the federal law
does not protect the right asserted. In application this means that the
current federal doctrine is treated as the presumptively correct standard for
state law as well, except when the state court finds persuasive reasons to
“depart” or “diverge” from the Supreme Court, or fill in gaps left by its
opinions.13
So, here a state generally follows federal precedent, but grants more rights under
its own constitution in certain limited instances. Under this approach, federal law is
analyzed first.
Finally, there is the “beyond reactive,” or again, in Professor Friesen’s terms, the
“primacy” method.14 Here, the state court engages in a truly separate and
independent state constitutional analysis, and analyzes state law first. With this
approach, Professor Friesen asserts, the state should look to its “common law history,

7
“The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security[.]” OHIO CONST.
art. I, § 4.
8

Arnold, 67 Ohio St. 3d at 43, 45-46, 616 N.E.2d at 169, 171.

9

Id. at syllabus ¶ 3.

10

See Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St. 3d 537, 795 N.E.2d 633 (2003) (holding that there is no
constitutional right to bear concealed weapons).
11

1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (3d ed. 2000).
12

Id. at § 1-6(c).

13

Id. at §§ 1-45, 1-46 (internal footnotes omitted).

14

Id. at § 1-6(a).
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state history, state policy, and constitutional structure as sources for independent
interpretation.”15 Federal precedent is relevant but not binding.16
OK, so whither Ohio? I have three contentions. First, despite the bold
announcement in Arnold, the court takes awhile to “get” it—except for Justice Craig
Wright, who got it right away and is really the leader of this movement, and the most
sophisticated analyst.
Second, on the criminal law side of the ledger, especially in the area of search
and seizure, the court has intentionally chosen to remain in lockstep with federal
precedent, because of the conservative bent of a majority of the justices about the
rights of criminal defendants.
Finally, on the civil side, the court has been more willing to sally forth—but even
when heading beyond the lockstep approach, it has not really engaged in the kind of
meaningful analysis that Professor Friesen suggests should characterize these
approaches. It has used more of what I call the “magic wand” view—simply an
announcement that Ohio is taking a different position. Justice Pfeifer has replaced
Justice Wright as the heir to the New Judicial Federalism Movement, but is a less
thorough analyst.
After Arnold, we’re going to see some to-ing and fro-ing. I’ve chosen as
examples cases involving speech and the press, searches and seizures, and religion.
I. SPEECH AND THE PRESS
A. Defamation
It’s always useful in these analyses to start by looking at a comparison of the
constitutional language. Identical language doesn’t always mean lockstep is going to
be the approach, nor does different language mean independent analysis. Still, it’s a
good place to start. With speech and the press, we are comparing the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution17 with Article I, Section 11 of the Ohio
Constitution.18
First, let’s look at defamation—an area where I think the court almost
accidentally fell into a beyond reactive posture.
The court’s defamation
jurisprudence can be seen as very, very bold, or as overly deferential to the media,
depending on one’s viewpoint.
The court’s view emerged before Arnold from the companion cases of a
wrestling coach named Milkovich, a school superintendent named Scott, and the
Willoughby News Herald newspaper.19 The question was whether a sportswriter for
the newspaper defamed the coach and the superintendent in his column.
15

Id. at § 1-42.

16

Id. at § 1-41.

17

“Congress shall make no law … abridging freedom of speech or of the press. . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
18

“Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right, and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech, or of the press.” OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11.
19

Milkovich v. News Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984); Scott v. News
Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
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The coach and the superintendent each sued the paper separately, and each case
got to the Ohio Supreme Court separately. In both cases, the media argued that the
column was an opinion and was therefore absolutely protected under federal law.20
In Milkovich’s case, which reached the Ohio Supreme Court first, the court rejected
that argument, and decided the case on the private figure/negligence basis.21 The
case was reversed and remanded.22
In Scott’s case, which reached the Ohio Supreme Court two years and one
election later, the court overruled Milkovich, declared school superintendent Scott a
public figure, and held the article to be opinion—which, as such, was absolutely
protected, both by Article I, Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution as a proper exercise
of freedom of the press, and by the First Amendment.23 It is worth noting that this
was intended as the lockstep approach, but was an incorrect interpretation of federal
law. Because of this, the Ohio Supreme Court is going to fall into a beyond reactive
posture.
Meanwhile, the Milkovich case, which had been reversed and remanded, was redecided in favor of the media, based on the opinion privilege set forth in Scott.24 The
U.S. Supreme Court accepted review of Milkovich and told the Ohio Supreme Court
in no uncertain terms that there is no separate opinion privilege under federal
constitutional law.25 The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the actual malice standard
of New York Times v. Sullivan26 as striking the proper balance between freedom of
the press and the protection of the reputation of public persons, and determined that
the language in the article was actionable.27
So what lesson does the Ohio Supreme Court take from this U.S. Supreme Court
rebuke in Milkovich? That it could avoid rebuke by truly relying on its own state
constitution. It’s going to move away from lockstep and chose affirmatively to find
a different interpretation under state law.
Let’s move to the post-Arnold world of defamation. The case is Vail v. Plain
Dealer Publishing Company;28 the year, 1995. Cleveland Plain Dealer columnist Joe
Dirk wrote some very dicey things about state senatorial candidate Loren Vail.29
Vail sued the newspaper for defamation. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the
dismissal of the case against the Plain Dealer on the basis of the opinion privilege it
had first announced in Scott.30 What about the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
20
Milkovich, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 298, 473 N.E.2d at 1196; Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 244, 496
N.E.2d at 701.
21

Milkovich, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 296-99, 473 N.E.2d at 1195-97.

22

Id. at 299, 473 N.E.2d at 1197.

23

Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 247-48, 254, 496 N.E.2d at 704, 709.

24

Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20, 545 N.E.2d 1320 (1989).

25

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 24 (1990).

26

Id. at 16 (referring to New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)).

27

Id. at 3.

28

72 Ohio St. 3d 279, 649 N.E.2d 182 (1995).

29

Id. at 282-83, 649 N.E.2d at 186.

30

Id. at 281, 649 N.E.2d at 185.
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Milkovich? The Vail court unapologetically concedes it may have been wrong in its
interpretation of federal law, but emphatically reaffirms the opinion privilege under
state law.31
Chief Justice Moyer, who authored the majority opinion, had this to say:
“Regardless of the outcome in Milkovich, the law in this state is that embodied in Scott.
The Ohio Constitution provides a separate and independent guarantee of protection for
opinion ancillary to freedom of the press.”32 He went on to hold the column was
protected opinion as a matter of law.33
I want to highlight the separate concurrence of Justice Wright in this case
because he is the most consistent voice for the “beyond lockstep” approach to the
New Judicial Federalism. He said:
I write separately not out of disagreement with some aspect of the Chief
Justice’s opinion, but to stress its stated underpinnings—Section 11,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution. Time and again, but never more clearly
than today, we have stressed that the protections accorded opinion under
the Ohio Constitution are broader than the First Amendment jurisprudence
developed by the United States Supreme Court.34
Justice Pfeifer, although concurring in the judgment, chided the court for relying
on nothing more than a “naked assertion that Section 11, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution provides greater protection for the publishing of opinions than the First
Amendment to the federal Constitution.”35 He believes that the Ohio Constitution is
actually stricter about abuses of the rights of free speech than the First Amendment.36
After Vail, the question remained as to whether this separate opinion privilege
was just for the media. The answer came in 2001 in Wampler v. Higgins,37 in which
the court held that “[t]he Ohio Constitution’s separate and independent protection for
opinions recognized in Scott . . . and reaffirmed in Vail, is not limited in its
application to the allegedly defamatory statements made by media defendants[.]”38
B. Ethnic Intimidation
Remember this talk is called a little to-ing and a little fro-ing. We’ve seen the toing. Now for a little fro-ing, where the court has not been quite so bold in striking
out on its own. Let’s look at ethnic intimidation, which I see as a toe in the “beyond
reactive” water, pulled out quickly when it gets burned. The case is State v. Wyant.39
At issue was a state law that created a penalty enhancement when certain menacing
31

Id. at 281, 649 N.E.2d at 185.

32

Id. at 281, 649 N.E.2d at 185.

33

Id. at 283, 649 N.E.2d at 186.

34

Id. at 284, 649 N.E.2d at 187 (Wright, J., concurring).

35

Id. at 285, 649 N.E.2d at 188 (Pfeiffer, J., concurring).

36

Id. at 285-86, 649 N.E.2d at 188 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).

37

93 Ohio St. 3d 111, 752 N.E.2d 962 (2001).

38

Id. at syllabus.

39

64 Ohio St. 3d 566, 597 N.E.2d 450 (1992) (hereinafter Wyant I).
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crimes were committed because of the race, color, religion, or national origin of the
victim.40 The predicate offenses were already crimes.41 The Ohio Supreme Court
held that the effect of the ethnic intimidation statute was to create a “thought crime”
in violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution, and the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.42 Certiorari was granted
in this case by the U.S. Supreme Court,43 along with a number of other state ethnic
intimidation cases.
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Wisconsin’s similar ethnic intimidation
statute in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,44 holding that a penalty enhancement increases
punishment for conduct, and does not impermissibly punish thought.45 The U.S.
Supreme Court sent Wyant back to the Ohio Supreme Court for reconsideration in
light of its holding in Mitchell.46
What happened in Wyant II?47 The court meekly retreated to lockstep. Here’s the
whole decision. “For the reasons stated in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, we vacate our
opinion in State v. Wyant and uphold the constitutionality of the ethnic intimidation
law, under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions.”48 This drew a strong
dissent by Justice Wright, joined by Justice Pfeifer. “Today, sad to say, we have
beaten a hasty retreat from our previous pronouncement in this very case. . . .”49
Whether or not the Mitchell decision dictates that “[Ohio’s ethnic intimidation
statute] be held constitutional under the First Amendment, I believe that it is
unconstitutional under Section 11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. As we said in
Wyant I, ‘the Constitution of Ohio is even more specific [than the First Amendment];
it guarantees to every citizen freedom to ‘speak, write and publish his sentiments on
all subjects.’”50
“Because the Ohio Constitution provides a more expansive protection for
freedom of speech than does the United States Constitution, nothing in the Mitchell
decision alters our conclusion in Wyant I that [Ohio’s ethnic intimidation statute]
violates the Ohio Constitution. . . .”51

40

OHIO REV. CODE § 2927.12 (1987).

41

Wyant I, 64 Ohio St. 3d at 570-71, 597 N.E.2d at 453.

42

Id. at syllabus.

43

Ohio v. Wyant, 508 U.S. 969 (1993).

44

508 U.S. 476 (1993).

45

Id. at 487-88.

46

Remand from the United States Supreme Court, No. 92-568.

47

State v. Wyant, 68 Ohio St. 3d 162, 624 N.E.2d 722 (1994) (hereinafter Wyant II).

48

Id. at 164, 624 N.E.2d at 724.

49

Id. at 164, 624 N.E.2d at 724 (Wright, J., dissenting).

50

Id. at 167, 624 N.E.2d at 726 (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting Wyant I, 64 Ohio St. 3d at
577, 597 N.E.2d at 457).
51

Id. at 168, 624 N.E.2d at 727 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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C. Speech on Private Shopping Mall Property
Next, let’s turn to speech on private property. The case is Eastwood Mall v.
Slanco.52 The year is 1994, which is after Arnold, before Vail, and the same year as
the Wyant remand. The issue is whether a private shopping mall can constitutionally
ban all handbilling, picketing, soliciting, and other similar activities done on its
property without its permission.53 Federal precedent at this time is yes, it can.54 The
Ohio Supreme Court chooses lockstep and also answers yes, holding that Article I,
Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution is no broader on this point than the federal First
Amendment.55 This again is over a strong dissent by Justice Wright:
It seems to me this court has taken one step forward but two steps
backward in recent cases involving interpretation of the Ohio
Constitution. The step forward occurred in Arnold v. Cleveland, when we
recognized the independent force of the Ohio Constitution. However, in
less than one year, this Court took a substantial step backwards in State v.
Wyant, when this Court failed even to address the “independent force” of
the Ohio Constitution as applied to the constitutionality of the ethnic
intimidation statute. Unhappily, a second step to the rear occurs today. In
the present case, Section 11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution loses much
of its independent force and appears as a mere shadow of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because I support the view
that “the Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force” and
believe that Section 11, Article I affords Ohio citizens greater civil
liberties and protections than does the First Amendment, I must
vigorously dissent. . . .56
As a point of comparison, when the state of California was confronted with this
same issue in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center,57 the California Supreme Court
struck down the anti-handbilling injunction, holding that the California Constitution
protects speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers, even
when the centers are privately owned.58
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE—LOCKSTEP ON PURPOSE
The language of the Fourth Amendment and of Article I, Section 14 is virtually
identical.59 While there have been a few aberrant “beyond lockstep” decisions, the

52

68 Ohio St. 3d 221, 626 N.E.2d 59 (1994).

53

Id. at 222, 626 N.E.2d at 60.

54

Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).

55

Eastwood Mall, 68 Ohio St. 3d at 223, 626 N.E.2d at 61.

56

Id. at 225, 626 N.E.2d at 62 (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting Arnold, 67 Ohio St. 3d at
42, 616 N.E.2d at 169).
57

592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).

58

592 P.2d at 347.

59

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
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Ohio Supreme Court has reined them in and has opted for a clear and intentional
policy of what it calls “harmonization” in this field.
In 1984, in State v. Burkholder,60 the court held that under the Ohio Constitution,
evidence obtained through an unreasonable or unlawful search and seizure is
inadmissible in a probation violation proceeding.61 However, twelve years later, in
1996, in State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority,62 the court expressly
overruled Burkholder and held that evidence obtained through an unreasonable or
unlawful search and seizure is generally admissible in both probation and parole
revocation proceedings.63 The Wright court criticized Burkholder for failing to
recognize that the Ohio Constitution should be “interpreted to protect the same
interests and in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”64
In 1992, relying on both the state and federal constitutions, the court held in State
v. Brown65 that a police officer may not open a small closed container found inside
the glove compartment solely as a search incident to the driver’s arrest for a traffic
violation, after the officer has the suspect and sole occupant of the vehicle under
control in the police cruiser.66 In April of 2002, in State v. Murrell,67 the court
expressly overruled Brown, holding that when a police officer has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile.68 In her majority opinion in Murrell, Justice Resnick wrote that the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio
Constitution are to be “harmonized.”69
And finally, I will discuss the Robinette cases, which I think had the most drastic
ramifications for Ohio’s approach to the New Judicial Federalism.

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person and things to be seized.
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14.
60

12 Ohio St. 3d 205, 466 N.E.2d 176 (1984).

61

Id. at 206, 466 N.E.2d at 178.

62

75 Ohio St. 3d 82, 661 N.E.2d 728 (1996).

63

Id. at 91, 661 N.E.2d at 735.

64

Id. at 88, 661 N.E.2d at 733.

65

63 Ohio St. 3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113 (1992).

66

Id. at 353, 588 N.E.2d at 116.

67

94 Ohio St. 3d 489, 764 N.E.2d 986 (2002).

68

Id. at 496, 764 N.E.2d at 993.

69

Id. at 495-96, 764 N.E.2d at 993.
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In 1995, the Ohio Supreme Court decided the first of the Robinette cases.70 This
was a routine traffic stop case.71 The court, in a decision authored by Justice Pfeifer,
upheld the suppression of drugs found in the car following an ostensibly consensual
search.72 The court formulated a new rule that after a valid detention, before any
interrogation could be deemed consensual, the citizen had to be told that he/she was
free to go73 (later referred to by Justice Ginsburg as the first-tell-then-ask test).74 The
court held this outcome was guaranteed by the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions (much as
it had done with the opinion privilege in Scott).75
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted review of this case,76 which it could not have
done had the case been decided on truly adequate and independent state grounds.77
The high court gave short shrift to the independent state grounds alleged in the
syllabus, holding that despite that statement, the entire analysis and underpinning of
the decision was federal law.78
Just as it had done in Milkovich, the U.S. Supreme Court again rebuked the Ohio
Supreme Court, telling the Ohio court that it had wrongly interpreted federal law.79
The case was reversed and remanded,80 with profound effect on Justice Pfeifer, as I
will discuss. I think he took this rebuke very much to heart, and he emerged as the
champion of the New Judicial Federalism after Justice Wright’s retirement, which
took place after Robinette was remanded.
When the case came back to the Ohio Supreme Court, the court could have
chosen either to analyze the case on truly adequate, independent state grounds or to
apply the federal test for consent correctly. Just as it had done in Wyant, the ethnic
intimidation case, the court chose to follow federal law, and declined to reexamine
its earlier decision on independent state grounds.81 Justice Wright was no longer on
the court to tweak his colleagues. The court vacated the first-tell-then-ask holding of
Robinette I’s syllabus, and held that “under Section 14, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution, the totality-of-the-circumstances test [which is the federal test82] is
70

State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 653 N.E.2d 695 (1995) (hereinafter Robinette I),
rev’d, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
71

Robinette I, 73 Ohio St. 3d at 653-54, 653 N.E.2d at 698.

72

Id. at syllabus ¶ 1.

73

Id. at syllabus ¶ 2.

74

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41 (1996) (hereinafter Robinette II) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
75

Robinette I, 73 Ohio St. 3d at 655, 653 N.E.2d at 699.

76

Ohio v. Robinette, 516 U.S. 1157 (1996).

77

Robinette II, 519 U.S. at 36-37; see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).

78

Robinette II, 519 U.S. at 36.

79

Id. at 39-40.

80

Id. at 40.

81

State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St. 3d 234, 237-39, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766-67 (1997)
(hereinafter Robinette III).
82

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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controlling in an unlawful detention to determine whether permission to search a
vehicle is voluntary.”83 The court did go on to find that even under this test,
Robinette’s consent had not been voluntary.84
Here are some concluding observations from Robinette III about the New Judicial
Federalism from Justice Stratton’s majority opinion: “Despite this wave of New
Federalism, where the provisions are similar and no persuasive reason for a differing
interpretation is presented, this court has determined that protections afforded by
Ohio's Constitution are coextensive with those provided by the United States
Constitution.”85
Thus, case law indicates that, consistent with Robinette II, “we should harmonize
our interpretation of Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution with the Fourth
Amendment, unless there are persuasive reasons to find otherwise.”86
After showing no inclination to depart from harmonization in this area, in the
summer of 2003 the Court upheld the suppression of crack cocaine obtained from a
custodial search following an arrest for jaywalking.87 The Court held that a full
custodial arrest for a minor misdemeanor ran afoul of the state Constitution, holding
that Section 14, Article I provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment
against warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors.88 While this is an important
exception, harmonization remains the stated policy in the area of search and
seizure.89
III. SCHOOL VOUCHERS
After Robinette comes the school voucher decision, Simmons-Harris v. Goff.90
To me, this case represents the court’s most disappointing failure to do a thorough
independent state constitutional analysis—which I believe would have warranted a
different result in the case, but that’s another talk. For comparison, I would like to
point to the analysis in Holmes v. Bush,91 in which a Leon County, Florida trial judge
held that the Florida school voucher program violated the state constitution.92
Let’s come back to Ohio. There were many challenges to the school voucher
program. I will talk here only about the religion challenges. There were two under
the Ohio Constitution—one under the school funds clause (Article VI, Section 2),93
83

Robinette III, 80 Ohio St. 3d at 245, 685 N.E.2d at 771.

84

Id. at 246, 685 N.E.2d at 771-72.

85

Id. at 238, 685 N.E.2d at 766.

86

Id. at 239, 685 N.E.2d at 767.

87

State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 323 (2003).

88

Id. at syllabus.

89

Id.

90

86 Ohio St. 3d 1, 711 N.E.2d 203 (1999).

91

No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2002).

92

Id. at *3.

93

“[N]o religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control
of, any part of the school funds of this state.” OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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the other under Ohio’s ban on religious establishment (Article I, Section 7).94 The
primary challenge, of course, was under the Establishment Clause of the federal First
Amendment.95 Justice Pfeifer authored this rather curious opinion (which has no
syllabus, and was actually decided under the arcane single-subject rule).
The court found no violation of any of the religion clauses, state or federal.96 As
for the school funds challenge, the court used a neutrality analysis that carried the
day when a separate challenge later reached the U.S Supreme Court.97 As for the
challenge under the state establishment clause equivalent, the Ohio Supreme Court
said this:
This court has had little cause to examine the Establishment Clause of our
own Constitution and has never enunciated a standard for determining
whether a statute violates it. Today we do so by adopting the elements of
the three-part Lemon test.98 We do this not because it is the federal
constitutional standard, but rather because the elements of the Lemon test
are a logical and reasonable method by which to determine whether a
statutory scheme establishes religion.99
And then, what I call the “I-heard-you-in-Robinette” passage:
There is no reason to conclude that the Religion Clauses of the Ohio
Constitution are coextensive with those in the United States Constitution,
though they have at times been discussed in tandem. The language of the
Ohio provisions is quite different from the federal language. Accordingly,
although we will not on this day look beyond the Lemon-Agostini100
framework, neither will we irreversibly tie ourselves to it. See Arnold v.
Cleveland [asserting that the Ohio Constitution is a document of
independent force].
We reserve the right to adopt a different
constitutional standard pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, whether because
the federal constitutional standard changes or for any other relevant

94
“No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship against
his consent, and no preference shall be given, by law, to any religious society. . . .” OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 7.
95
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
96

Simmons-Harris, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 4, 711 N.E.2d at 207.

97
Id. at 7-8, 711 N.E.2d at 210. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir.
2000), rev’d, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). The school voucher program
provided tuition assistance to needy children, allowing families to choose among participating
schools that included private, public, religious and non-religious schools. 234 F.3d at 948. On
appeal, even though 96% of the students in the program enrolled in religiously affiliated
schools, the U.S. Supreme Court held the program did not violate the Establishment Clause
because schools were selected wholly as a result of truly independent choices by parents and
students. 536 U.S. at 652.
98

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).

99

Simmons-Harris, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 211 (citations omitted).

100

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13; Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223, 230-33 (1997).
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reason. We reiterate the reasoning discussed during our analysis of the
federal constitutional standard, and although we now analyze pursuant to
the Ohio Constitution, we not surprisingly reach the same conclusion. We
conclude that the School Voucher Program does not have an
impermissible legislative purpose or effect and does not excessively
entangle the state and religion. The School Voucher Program does not
violate Section 7, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.101
So, even though the language in both state religion clauses is quite different from
the federal First Amendment, in Simmons-Harris, the Ohio Supreme Court chose
lockstep, but in a manner suggesting that it had learned its lesson in Robinette.
Although the court did not even attempt any real separate state constitutional
analysis, it left the door open for a “beyond lockstep” moment in the future. That
future moment arrived in 2000 in the persona of a prison guard with long hair.
IV. FREE EXERCISE
102

In Humphrey v. Lane, the plaintiff was a Native American who wore his hair
long as part of his practice of Native American spirituality.103 But that conflicted
with the prison grooming policy.104 After Humphrey was told to cut his hair or be
fired, he filed suit in state court raising a free exercise challenge to the policy.105
Federal law at this point was to apply a rational basis test for religion-neutral laws
that have an incidental effect of burdening religious practices.106 But the Ohio
Supreme Court opted for a supplemental, or reactive posture, which shows it is
getting bolder. In this free exercise challenge, Ohio expressly rejected the federal
test in favor of the stricter compelling state interest test.107 The opinion author is
again Justice Pfeifer. Although the court found the state had proven the grooming
policy furthered a compelling state interest, it failed to prove the policy was the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest.108 So Humphrey won his case, and was
allowed to keep his long hair pinned under his cap.109 Although the court held that
under the Ohio Constitution free exercise protection is broader than under the U.S.
Constitution, there is little analysis underpinning this position.110

101

Simmons-Harris, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 211-12 (citations omitted).

102

89 Ohio St. 3d 62, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (2000).

103

Id. at 68-69, 728 N.E.2d at 1045.

104

Id. at 69, 728 N.E.2d at 1045.

105

Id. at 69, 728 N.E.2d at 1045.

106

Empl. Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

107

Humphrey, 89 Ohio St. 3d at 68, 728 N.E.2d at 1045.

108

Id. at 70-71, 728 N.E.2d at 1047.

109

Id. at 69-71, 728 N.E.2d at 1046-47.

110

Id. at 68, 728 N.E.2d at 1045.
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V. CONCLUSION
Let me conclude with these observations. While the Ohio Supreme Court has
been part of the New Judicial Federalism movement now for a decade, I think the
court is still struggling with the fundamentals. It has gotten the concept but hasn’t
really engaged in the kind of rigorous analysis the subject deserves. Since we now
have a court majority with a very different philosophy from the court that signed on
to the New Judicial Federalism Movement during this last decade, it will be
interesting to see in what areas of the law, if any, the court is willing to find greater
protections under Ohio’s Constitution.
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